Rose Bowl Review: Utah's Rushing Attack
Take a deep dive into the numbers and scheme behind Utah's rushing game vs. Ohio State.
This article is Part 1 of a 2 part series analyzing Utah’s offensive performance in the Rose Bowl. This entry will focus on the rushing attack.
Running the ball in the Rose Bowl was anything but consistent for the Utes. 226 yards on 5 yards per carry would have led me to believe they dominated the line of scrimmage and had no problems rushing the football. However, upon watching the film, I found myself confused and frustrated. A clearly physically more dominant team struggled (at times) to sort the defense and identify proper blocking schemes. The rushing game, specifically the schemes, was inconsistent. When things were going well for Utah, they were going really well. Setting aside the ridiculously lucky “explosive” TD run, the Utes rushed for 145 on 34 carries (4.26 ypc). Yet, there were yards left on the field, and in close games, execution on every play is paramount.
Let’s dig into the numbers quickly before talking about scheme. Tight and wide zone paired with counter and duo compiled the bulk of the run menu. Both zone concepts graded out as less than 40% efficient1, 37.5% for tight2 (4ypc), and just 18% for wide (1.9 ypc). Counter had similar efficiency at 34.4% (3.43 yards per carry), while duo was 80% efficient (7.8 yards per carry). We will take a look at the film to figure out how each scheme was met with both great success and failure throughout the game.
Wide Zone
The most called scheme for the Utes was their wide zone concept. I like the variance in personnel grouping, pre-snap movement, and frontside surfaces Utah presented the defense. However, in total, the wide zone concept was not great for the offense. Wide zone concepts are about 1) creating vertical seams in the defense and 2) having a back find the seam, stick his foot in the ground and accelerate through the hole.
Here I take a look at a couple of snaps of Utah’s wide zone and explain why there was (or was not) success for those goals.
Counter
There were two main takeaways from Utah’s use of counter schemes. The first was personnel usage, heavy was the menu for counter schemes. With 4 snaps of 12p and 3 snaps of 13p, it was clear Utah felt they could move the line of scrimmage. While they could create push, it was also obvious there was confusion at the point of attack. Undoubtedly, Utah’s counter presentations slowed down the defense. But violence, specifically, defensive speedy, athletic, committed acts of aggression, often trumped whiteboard W’s.
Take for example the 5th play of the 2nd Ute drive. I thought this was one of the best designed and called plays of the game but it was also one of the worst executed. The bash tag, designates the backside end (#11) as the read, as he steps upfield, Rising correctly pulls the ball and begins his track behind the second puller. Before digging into the point of attack, I really like the added arc block on the backside. Had the ball been given to the back, the offense had great numbers on the perimeter. The arc-ing wing had a good angle to work to the overhand, allowing the slot receiver to get up to the safety.
Against the defensive over front. The frontside tackle, guard and center work down to the BSLB, Nose and BS3T respectively. While these pieces work well, the pullers and playside TE are what sours the play. Starting with the inline TE, his responsibility is to arc and kick out the first thing color outside the End. He arcs too wide, is out of control and subtly ducks his head just before contact. The much-undersized corner shows up in his fit, contacts and sheds the TE, and makes a play on the ball. Additionally, neither of the pullers accounts for the playside End. The End hugs the down block of the PST and both the pulling guard and tackle bypass the end who forces the Q to abort his path. Had the guard logged the end, allowing the tackle to lead up to the PSLB (or vice-versa), this WOULD have been a much larger gain.
Even on their longest rush of counter, it took a great play by the ball carrier to remedy miscommunication in the blocking scheme. Like the bash counter call earlier, the down blocks of the PSG and C are good. The play starts to unravel on the frontside. Defensively, the frontside end (#9) aligns head up on the TE and rips into the B gap forcing the LT to block him down as he is on his B-gap path. The End rips into an interior gap because the defense is bringing a corner blitz. Like the play earlier, the TE arcs and sees the corner late, tries to redirect but can’t get there in time. The first puller, BSG #78 sees this action and kicks out the corner, the 2nd puller, Wing #86, base blocks first color he sees BSLB #35. This leaves the PSLB free to make the tackle, however the back makes him miss. Again, on a play they should have had an extra hat (and even SHOULD have been able to get up to the safety) the Utes were left with a 1on1 in the hole. Hats off to the DC for blitzing and causing confusion, but having broken down a couple games of Ohio State's defense, corner blites specifically when the boundary receiver is in a condensed or crack-alignment are common. Utah should have been prepared for this blitz, and again, it seems as though they left yards on the field on this snap.
DUO
Duo was the most efficient run concept for the Utes. Called five times, it netted 39 yards, and was efficient four times. It was used in two situations, either on first and ten, believing it was a safe call, or on third and short, trusting the heavy double teams could get push.
On the last snap call of Duo for the game, a mental blunder (again) cost the Utes. Traditionally, motion is used to allow a perimeter player to add himself into the run scheme, block the force player and cause a DB to be in coverage. Using a Z-short motion, the goal was for the receiver to base block the Sam #2. However, when the ball is snapped, he doesn’t, he blocks the corner. The back follows his track, goes opposite the flow of the LB’s and expects to be one on one with the corner #26 who should have been left unblocked. The back is left out to dry, and must cut back into the trash at the line of scrimmage for a minimal gain. Instead of forcing a great matchup, back vs. corner, the offense is left with a 3 yard gain and a 2nd & 7 for the backup QB.
While it was a good day for the Utah offense, they left some meat on the bone. One can only hypothesize what the outcome of this close game had been if there had been more communication and a higher percentage of execution for the Utes.
I am old-school when it comes to grading efficiency for individual plays. I know there are new analytics for calculating and defining efficiency but the way I was taught makes sense to me and is a great measurement in my opinion. Efficiency is situational. On 1st down, a play is efficient if it gains 4≤ yards. 2nd down plays are efficient if they halve (or greater) the yards to gain (a 6 yard gain on 2nd & 8 is efficient while a 6 yard gain on 2nd & 15 is not). 3rd Down plays are efficient when they gain a first down. Sure this may lead to some issues for long gains on long 3rd downs, but for most situations, it’s a good system.
Removed one rush, the long TD run of Rising.