Oregon Offense: Drive 7
3rd Quarter 10:25
Oregon 21 - Ohio State 14
After a relatively low scoring 1st half that saw Oregon leading 14-7, the first five minutes of the second half featured the fireworks many were expecting. On their first possession of the second half, Oregon running back CJ Verdell popped a 77 yard touchdown on a split zone bluff. Ohio State, facing a two-score deficit, responded with a 3 minute, 7 play, 75 yard TD drive. With the Horseshoe rocking, Oregon started their next drive looking to take back the momentum the Buckeyes were starting to feel.
Play 1, 1st & 10, 10:25, -25 Yard Line
11P, Trips Left (Nub) Back Strong (to TE)
G-Tb Pin Pull vs. Over G
This was the first of several well designed and called plays during this drive. Advantageous blocking angles and numbers were the keys to success for Oregon this drive on their efficient plays. Facing an Over front with a 6T, Oregon liked their chances to pin box defenders, pull and lead with the frontside guard and tailback on a QB sweep. When running pin pull, there are two things the defense can do to ruin the play: 1) win the edge vs. the TE and 2) linebacker aggressively shoot through a gap to run down the ball.
The TE does a fantastic job of base blocking the 6T End. While a 6T is a player offenses feel okay about pinning, it can be a tough task for a TE to win the edge. Some coaches teach an influence technique in which the TE will step first with his inside foot to encourage the defender to also step inside, then making the pin easier to execute. (TE #88, for example)
However, here without using that technique, the TE is able to pin the 6T, getting his hips parallel to the sideline. Given that he was the edge of the offensive formation, and how quickly the ball was going to get to the perimeter, the TE needed to ensure he was not going to get beat over the top, the End would have been hard pressed to play underneath the pin and run down the QB from behind. The short edge also mitigated opportunities for defensive run through from the second level. #14 the Down Safety is the force defender and #35 the playside linebacker both need to turn the ball back inside. Once identifying pin and pull, they both aggressively need to set an edge and box the lead back and puller, respectively. The puller, LG #56 shows great speed, balance and skill in space to kick out the playside linebacker, and the tailback’s angle forces the safety to widen to attempt to set an edge, creating a big lane for the ball carrier, QB #13, Anthony Brown. On the backside, facing a 2T, the guard is able to reach the Nose, and the center climbs to the second level to cut off the Will backer.
Wherever the Free Safety is making tackles in the run game, the offense is executing on a high level. The 13 yard run was a fantastic start to this series, and clearly a call Oregon felt comfortable with.
-Frontside #s - 4 for 4 with good Angles.
-Backside #s- 3 for 3 with good angles.
Play 2, 1st & 10, 10:18, -38 Yard Line
11P Doubles Left Wing (BD WR Bunch Splits, Field WR Hash Splits)
Split Zone Z Fade RPO
The second play of the drive was a product of taking advantage of defensive adjustments. Earlier in the game Oregon had come out with similar sets, putting a Wing TE and reduced split wideout into the boundary with an offset back strong. Ohio State had aligned to the set two ways and played 1 coverage from each alignment. They aligned in single high and played Cover 3, or, play 2-high, showed a cloud look to the TE and blitzed the corner and slanted the front to the field. Having seen this for a few snaps, I believe Oregon made an adjustment to take advantage of this defensive look. Showing cloud pre-snap, Oregon put the receiver to the boundary on a wide fade, in essence putting him in the hole vacated by the blitzing corner. With the safety playing the deep 3rd and the flat defender in the box preoccupied with the run, there is a big opening for the pass. I believe this was something that was called from the sideline when the defense showed this look and the run was secondary, and they had no intention of handing the ball off. In fact, the run blocking is awkward. It appears to be split zone, but on the backside, the tackle appears to take a short pass set to block the end, and there would be no one for the TE to kick out. In-game adjustments to the defensive game plan was something that Coach Moorhead deserves more credit for, and this play was a testament to the attention to detail for players and coaches alike.
Play 3, 2nd & 1, 9:44, -47 Yard Line
11P Quads Right Wing
GY Counter
From a non-traditional formation, Oregon runs a scheme they are familiar with, counter to an open side. On this snap, the defensive under front aligns a 40 backer (#3) to the boundary and the mike (#35) plussed out to the field. The center, PSG and PST all block down, while on the backside, the tackle hinges to secure the B-gap, the guard pulls around to kick the End, and the TE follows, wrapping up for the Will. Given the angle the Will takes to take on the second puller (TE), the defense was aiming to spill the pullers sending the ball to the sideline, but the offense did a great job of kicking out both the End and Will. A couple of missed tackles and a defensive facemask penalty result in a gain of 30 on the play.
Play 4, 1st & 10, 9:10, 23 Yard Line
Empty Trips Right T-Back
G PA Smash - Drive
One thing I enjoy studying in regards to specific play callers is how they layer concepts. As is always discussed at clinics, the goal of offensive play-callers is to create a scheme that the players can consistently execute at a high level. In fact, the most effective offenses are usually rather simple, allowing for players to understand the concept, leaving room to add constraints, wrinkles, and room to scaffold. When all is said and done with this specific play, it’s smash to the boundary, and a variation of a Mills or NCAA concept to the field. However, the formation, motion, and play-pass protection are what separates this play from the Day 1 install.
The motion and formation do many things, the most important of which is to “undress the defense”. The nub set quickly forces the defense to make a decision: 1)put the Corner into the boundary and the Safety to the field, forcing the Corner to become an integral part of the run fit vs. a run to the boundary OR 2) put the Corner to the field and Safety to the boundary, and limit coverage possibilities to both the field and boundary.
Like earlier in the drive, the defense goes Corner over. The backfield action, down block of the tackle and pulling guard all look nearly identical to the pin-pull sweep earlier in the drive, freezing the boundary End long enough for the guard to kick him out. To the boundary, OSU is playing MEG defense, assigning the Safety and Mike to the Tight-End and Tailback in man coverage respectively. Both play their coverage successfully, as we can imagine they are well-versed in covering these routes. The coverage to the field is a different story. By playing a Corner over the #3 receiver, the defense has less coverage answers. Opting to play what looks like spot drop cover 3, I believe the answer was to play a “safe” coverage. I am not an expert in defensive route distribution in cover 3, but there seems to be a lack of communication and understanding in how to pass off the underneath routes from the slot Corner and Will backer. In their defense, who knows how many times in practice they had been in this situation.
Seasoned offensive coordinators create ambiguity, confusion and lapses in communication for the defenses while keeping the scheme digestible for the offense.
Play 5, 1st & 10, 8:46,11 Yard Line
Train Right Wing X-In
PA Split Zone Burst Smash
Play 6, 2nd & Goal, 8:05, 11 Yard Line
Duo Left T-Exit
QB Zone Left
Expecting and getting man coverage, Oregon goes to a QB Zone set up by the tailback exiting the box with pre-snap motion. Left with a 5 man box and a hat for a hat, this play was about having an efficient, steady call to allow for an open playbook on 3rd down. If I was coaching the QB, our conversation after the series would have been about selling that he was going to throw the bubble to the back. Given the alignment of the defense, the free hitter was the free safety and he makes the tackle because he triggers almost immediately. I believe he has the freedom to do this because the QB never lies with his eyes to hold the free safety. Even knowing that it was man coverage and the back was not a good option for an RPO based on numbers to the field, if the QB can momentarily give the FS some pause, he may have created more space for himself. However, without nitpicking, this was an efficient play and allowed for the play caller to dig deep into his bag for the 3rd down call.
Play 7, 3rd & Goal, 7:53 ,5 Yard Line
Duo Left Switch (Y&X) Y-Over
Power Read Left (X-Pin)
Another beautifully designed, called and executed play to put a cap on this drive for the Ducks. The key to this play was the advantageous blocking angles. Gap-down-backer rules are in place for the frontside of the line. The LG does a wonderful job of handling a head up technique, not requiring a double team from the tackle which allows him to climb to the second level and get enough of the Mike to spring the back. In my opinion, the Ducks win this play at the line of scrimmage before the ball is even snapped. It appears that the defense is trying to fall back into gaps again on this play, however rather than it being the backside of a zone concept, it's the frontside of a gap scheme. In addition, by using the X-receiver (a perimeter player) to “lock the box” and pin the Will, necessitates the defense add a fitter as well. The corner should have set the edge for the defense, and forced the ball back inside.
“Those particular plays we were in man to man coverage, the guy who was covered man to man was cracking the linebacker and we got to get off and make a play there”
-Ohio State DC Kerry Coombs in a postgame interview
Compounding the frustration for the Buckeye defense was their inability to adjust, Oregon had scored their first touchdown (capping a 99-yard drive) on a similar scheme. The Ducks totaled 269 yards on the ground averaging 7.1 yards per carry.
In fact, the defense has such a hard time fitting this run that the puller does not even have to block anyone. This however may be a case of allowing the guard to lead up past the end if he sees the C-gap player is going to spill his block. On the backside, both the tackle and TE hinge to secure the B and C-gaps respectively. There is simply too much traffic in the box for the unblocked safeties to run down the play from behind. A well executed end to an efficient drive for the Ducks.